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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
STEVEN D. CLEMENTS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970411-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1997). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court's comments to the jury regarding 
recessing for deliberation at another time and inquiring of the 
jury as to whether they were unable to agree on a verdict, his 
comments regarding his hope that they reach a verdict that evening, 
and his instruction to the jury that their decision was not a 
complicated one and that it involved only one real issue on the one 
count, that being either "yes" or *no" would constitute a coercive 
use of an Allen charge. 
In reviewing the trial court's Allen charge, this Court must 
consider whether the language of the trial court's supplemental 
1 
instruction can properly be considered to be coercive per se, or 
coercive "under the specific circumstances of the case." Lactod, 
761 P.2d 23, 30-31 (Utah App. 1988). 
Further, the question is properly before this Court as it 
appears that Appellant is correct in its assertion that Appellate 
review of an verdict urging instruction is not barred where counsel 
was not forewarned of the instruction and had no opportunity to 
know of, or object to, it until after it was given to the jury, 
Lactod, 761 P.2d at 29. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The test of Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
which addresses jury instructions is set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
Steven D. Clements appeals from the judgment, sentence and 
commitment imposed by the Honorable John C. Backlund after a jury 
trial where he was convicted of Driving under the Influence of 
Alcohol, a Class A Misdemeanor, and Open Container, a Class C 
Misdemeanor. 
2. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
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Clements was charged by information with Driving under the 
Influence of Alcohol, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 41-6-44, and Open Container, a Class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44.20 
on or about July 15, 1996 (R. 2-3). 
On May 28, 1997, a jury trial was held in this matter in the 
Orem Department, Fourth District Court, the Honorable John C. 
Backlund presiding, (R.113-14, 141). After the jury had 
deliberated for approximately two hours, they were asked to reenter 
the courtroom where the following dialogue took place: 
THE COURT: We'll go on the record now.... Both 
counsel are present, as is Mr. Clements. We have invited 
the six members of the jury to come into the court. Members 
of the jury, have you been able to arrive at a verdict? And 
who is your foreperson? 
MR. HALL: Well, they said I would be. 
THE COURT: We'll its now 7:30 and the jury has been 
deliberating approximately two hours. It would be my 
proposal that we recess at this time. We have this calendar 
every Wednesday at 1 o'clock. If you can't reach a verdict 
this evening, that we reconvene at 1 o'clock next Wednesday, 
I 
and that I handle other cases and other calendar while 
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you're in the jury room. Then you can take as long as you 
need to arrive at a verdict. 
Do you think that will be worthwhile? Or if you think 
that you're unable to arrive at a verdict at this time, you 
can tell me that also. If you just don't think you can 
unanimously agree on a verdict on each count. 
MR. HALL: Some of us think we should go back in for 
two minutes. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's do that, then. We will have you 
brought back out in five minutes, then. If you can't, then we will 
have to figure out something else to do. I would sincerely hope 
that you can reach a verdict this evening. This is not a 
complicated case. There's only one real issue here on the one 
count, and it's either "yes" or "no". You have to make up your 
minds, folks. So we'll have you brought out again in five 
minutes, then 
(Trial Transcript ["Transcript"] at 137-39). 
After this dialogue the jury deliberated for approximately 
another five minutes and returned with a verdict of "guilty" on 
both counts (Transcript at 139-40) . Clements was sentenced to one 
year in the Utah State Prison consecutive to the sentence he was 
serving in 
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another case and a $2500.00 fine (R. 117, Transcript at 143). On 
June 
27, 1997, a notice of appeal was filed with the trial court and 
this action followed (R. 134). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Appellee is satisfied with the Statement of Relevant Facts 
provided by Appellant and therefore does not include them herein, 
except to state that during the direct examination of Deputy Skip 
Curtis, counsel for the Defendant/Appellant stipulated that the 
breath alcohol result of the intoxilyzer was .157, over the legal 
limit of .08 [Transcript at 48]. Further, in closing arguments 
both counsel agreed that the only issue remaining on the Driving 
Under the Influence charge was whether the State could prove that 
the Defendant was in physical control of a motor vehicle 
[Transcript at 128.] 
Appellee also includes a brief background of the 
circumstances at trial: 
This case was heard in the Orem Municipal Division of the 
Fourth District Court. Because of the way the Fourth District 
courts have been organized, all Class A misdemeanors which occur 
5 
in the county rather than in one of the cities which have a 
municipal division are filed in the Orem Municipal Division. The 
calendar for this type of offense is a Wednesday afternoon 
calendar. The judge that presides over that calendar is 
scheduled only on Wednesday afternoons, spending the remainder of 
the week in the municipal departments of American Fork, and 
Spanish Fork, Utah. All Class A arraignments, pre-trials, 
entries of plea, suppression hearings, bench trials and jury 
trials heard by the court must be heard on that Wednesday 
afternoon calendar. [See Affidavit of Carla Stephenson, Court 
Clerk, "Affidavit"]. 
On the day of this trial, the Court had begun at its usual 
scheduled time of 1:00. The calendar had been shortened in 
anticipation of the jury trial, but still consisted of 23-25 
arraignments (See Affidavit and Trial Transcript "Transcript" at 
3). Therefore, the jury trial was delayed. Evidence and 
testimony was presented, and by the time the jury went into 
deliberations at approximately 5:30 p.m., the work day had almost 
ended. At 7:30 p.m., after the jury had deliberated for two 
hours, the judge asked the bailiff to bring the jurors back into 
the courtroom so that the court could ascertain where they stood 
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in their deliberations. The jury had not indicated they were 
deadlocked. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A supplemental administrative statement or verdict-urging 
instruction to a deliberating jury that is not deadlocked is not 
prohibited provided the instruction is not coercive per se or 
coercive under the specific circumstances of the case. 
In this case, the trial court's initial statements, which 
are more properly described as administrative, were to a jury 
which had been deliberating two hours, and which had not 
indicated in any way that they were deadlocked or unable to reach 
a decision. In fact, the majority of the court's statements, and 
those which Appellant objects to, were made after the jury 
indicated that they could reach a decision very soon. 
The trial court explained the logistical problems with his 
calendar to the jury, and next inquired of the jury to get an 
indication how he should next proceed. The judge inquired 
whether the jurors felt it would be worthwhile to reconvene in 
one week, or if they were unable to unanimously agree on a 
verdict, to tell him that as well. The jury foreman then 
7 
indicated they needed only a few minutes more of deliberation. 
The Judge then went one to make other comments, which are 
the comments more specifically objected to by Appellant. 
Appellee argues that after applying the test set out in Lactod, 
7 61 P.2d, to determine whether the statements were coercive per 
se or coercive according to the specific circumstances, the 
statements are not coercive. 
The statements are not coercive per se because the judge did 
not give an instruction which was inherently coercive, nor did he 
make statements which would clearly force jurors to reach a 
decision or give up conscientiously held beliefs. In fact, the 
judge told the jury that if they were unable to reach a decision 
they could tell him that as well. 
Appellant argues that the statements were coercive per se, 
arguing that the judge required the jury to reach a decision. 
However, that argument takes the statements out of context from 
their meaning and the meaning the jury would have attached to 
them. These statements related to elements on the Driving Under 
the Influence Charge which had been stipulated to by counsel, and 
were not statements which required the jury to reach a decision 
or which commented improperly on the strength of the evidence, 
8 
but focused rather on the issues remaining for the jury to 
decide. 
Further, should the Court construe that this statement did 
ask the jury to reach a decision, Appellee argues that a judge 
can instruct a non-deadlocked jury to reach a decision. 
Finally, under the specific circumstances analysis there was 
no coercion because there was no significant colloquy between the 
judge and jury; the few additional minutes the jury deliberated 
for after returning to their deliberations cannot infer coercion 
when the jury was not deadlocked and had indicated it needed only 
a few minutes more; and informing the jury that they may have to 
return next week to continue deliberations was not unreasonable, 
nor an abuse of discretion, and therefore not coercive. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EXPRESSION OF DESIRE TO RECONVENE 
IN ONE WEEK'S TIME AFTER TWO HOURS OF DELIBERATION WAS NOT 
COERCIVE WHEN JURY WAS NOT DEADLOCKED AND REQUESTED 
TWO MORE MINUTES OF DELIBERATION 
1. BACKGROUND. 
This type of issue is a relatively new one to Utah courts. 
While the Utah Court of Appeals did decide a verdict urging issue 
in State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d (Utah App. 1988), that case involved 
9 
a deadlocked jury and a more traditional verdict urging 
instruction which the trial court had given. 
Because of the lack of Utah case law on the issue of an 
instruction to a deliberating but not deadlocked jury, we have 
looked to case law from other jurisdictions in preparing our 
argument. 
Clements was charged with two separate offenses: Open 
Container and Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. Both charges 
were submitted to the Jury for a decision. The jury had been 
deliberating for approximately two hours, having begun 
deliberations that day at approximately 5:30 p.m., it was then 
approximately 7:30 p.m. 
On the day of trial, the Court had begun at its usual 
scheduled time of 1:00. The calendar had been shortened in 
anticipation of the jury trial, but still consisted of 23-25 
matters (See Affidavit and Transcript at 3). Therefore, the jury 
trial was delayed. Evidence and testimony was presented, and by 
the time the jury began deliberations, the work day had almost 
ended. After two hours of deliberation, at 7:30 p.m., the judge 
asked the bailiff to bring the jurors back into the courtroom so 
that the court could ascertain where they stood in their 
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deliberations. Thereupon the following dialogue took place. 
THE COURT: We'll go on the record now.... Both 
counsel are present, as is Mr. Clements. We have invited 
the six members of the jury to come into the court. Members 
of the jury, have you been able to arrive at a verdict? And 
who is your foreperson? 
MR. HALL: Well, they said I would be. 
THE COURT: We'll its now 7:30 and the jury has been 
deliberating approximately two hours. It would be my 
proposal that we recess at this time. We have this calendar 
every Wednesday at 1 o'clock. If you can't reach a verdict 
this evening, that we reconvene at 1 o'clock next Wednesday, 
and that I handle other cases and other calendar while 
you're in the jury room. Then you can take as long as you 
need to arrive at a verdict. 
Do you think that will be worthwhile? Or if you think 
that you're unable to arrive at a verdict at this time, you 
can tell me that also. If you just don't think you can 
unanimously agree on a verdict on each count. 
MR. HALL: Some of us think we should go back in for 
two minutes. 
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THE COURT: All right. Let's do that, then. We will have you 
brought back out in five minutes, then. If you can't, then we will 
have to figure out something else to do. I would sincerely hope 
that you can reach a verdict this evening. This is not a 
complicated case. There's only one real issue here on the one 
count, and it's either "yes" or "no". You have to make up your 
minds, folks. So we'll have you brought out again in five 
minutes, then[.] 
2. STATEMENTS WERE GENERALLY ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE. 
The trial court's statements in this case were generally 
administrative in nature and related more to scheduling problems 
than an actual effort by the trial judge to urge the jury to reach 
a verdict. 
Arguably the statement made herein was not an instruction, as 
it related mainly to administrative scheduling concerns, and 
therefore should not be subjected to the scrutiny of an Allen 
charge, Andrews v. State, 794 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 
1990), which held that "a communication concerning an 
administrative matter, even though the procedure is set by law, 
does not amount to an additional instruction," id., at 48. 
3. UNDER THE TEST SET OUT IN LACTOD THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT 
COERCIVE PER SE. 
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However, should the Court find that some of the trial court's 
statements were of a verdict urging nature, we should look at the 
test set out in State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1988) . In 
Lactod, this Court found that a verdict urging instruction given 
after the jury had reported an inability to reach a verdict was not 
coercive per se or coercive under the specific circumstances of the 
case. In Lactod1/ approximately five hours after the jury had been 
excused to deliberate, the jury indicated that it was having 
trouble reaching a verdict. The trial judge requested that the 
jury return to the courtroom, and then, without informing counsel 
beforehand, gave an instruction in which he urged the jury to be as 
compromising as best they could without surrendering their honest 
and true feelings, while emphasizing that he and the jury had 
invested substantial time on the case and that he did not have 
another day to spend on the case, 761 P.2d at 28. 
In Lactod, this Court found that the trial court's instruction 
In the present situation counsel was not forewarned 
that the court was about to enter a verdict-urging instruction, 
and as occurred in Lactod, did not object. The Lactod court held 
that where counsel was not aware of the contents of such an 
instruction, failure to object to it prior or after it was given 
should not bar consideration of the charge on appeal, at 29. 
Therefore it appears that the matter is properly before the 
court. 
13 
was not coercive per se because the instruction in Lactod did not 
give an instruction which was inherently coercive, such as telling 
the jury that it was required to reach a decision, or statements 
which would clearly force jurors to reach a decision or to give up 
conscientiously held beliefs, 761 P.2d at 31. 
Appellant argues that the judge's statement was coercive per 
se, arguing "that the judge told the jury that they had to reach 
either a "guilty" or "not guilty" verdict [Appellant's Brief at 
13]. The judge never used those words. While the judge did say, 
"This is not a complicated case. There's only one real issue here 
on the one count, and it's either *yes' or xno.' You have to make 
up your minds, folks" [Transcript at 138-39]. These statements did 
not require the jury to reach a decision on the verdict itself, but 
asked them to reach a decision on the element of physical control. 
Before that statement was made, the judge had asked the jury 
where they stood in deliberations, whether they had reached a 
decision, or if they were unable to reach a decision stating, "Or 
if you think you're unable to arrive at a verdict at this time, you 
can tell me that also. If you just don't think you can unanimously 
agree on a verdict on each count," [Transcript at 138.] 
To argue that the judge was requiring a guilty or not guilty 
14 
verdict, after the judge had just told them they could reach 
another decision—that of no decision--is to take the judge's 
entire statement out of context- The judge had just told the jury 
that they could tell him if they were unable to reach a verdict; 
clearly, the jury understood from that statement that they did not 
have to return a verdict if they were unable to agree. The jury 
had never indicated that they were unable to reach a verdict, and 
in fact, had indicated that they could return a verdict within a 
few minutes. 
The fact that they did return a verdict within a few minutes 
after returning to deliberate demonstrates that they were in fact, 
close to a decision before being disturbed in their deliberations. 
To understand what the judge meant in stating "it's either 
xyesf or xno' it is necessary to look at the statement in context 
of what had occurred previously in trial. Counsel for the 
defendant had stipulated to the fact that the Defendant was an 
extremely intoxicated individual, agreeing that the Defendant's 
breath alcohol content was over .08, that in fact the breath 
alcohol content was .157 [Transcript at 48]. In closing arguments 
both counsel agreed that the only issue remaining on the one count, 
the DUI count, was whether the State could prove that the Defendant 
15 
was in physical control of a motor vehicle [Transcript at 128]. 
The judge's statement, "it's either ^yes' or *no,' related to 
the issue of physical control of the vehicle—the defendant either 
was in physical control of the vehicle, or he was not. While this 
statement by the judge did illustrate the relative simplicity of 
the issues before them, it was not a comment on the strength of the 
evidence itself. 
Nothing in the facts demonstrates that the jury "was coerced 
into surrendering views conscientiously held," the test for showing 
coercion either in its context or in the circumstances set out in 
Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S.Ct. 1059 (1965). 
These statements clearly did not force the jurors to reach a 
decision or to give up their conscientiously held beliefs, as such, 
they cannot properly be said to be coercive. 
A. Non-Deadlocked Jury Can be Instructed to Return a 
Verdict. 
Even if we assume that the judge did instruct the jury as a 
whole to return a verdict, this is not an error. While ordering a 
deadlocked jury to return a verdict is not permissible under 
Jenkins, it is acceptable to instruct a non-deadlocked jury that 
they must return a verdict, as held in People v. Genqler, 620 
N.E.2d 1368, 1375 (111. Ct. App. 1993). 
16 
In Genqler/ the jury sent a written question to the trial 
court asking whether it could return a verdict on only two of the 
three counts. The Appellate Court of Illinois distinguished this 
case from the facts in Jenkins, where the deadlocked jury had 
indicated they were unable to agree on a verdict because of 
insufficient evidence and the trial court had responded that the 
jury had to reach a decision," [emphasis added], Jenkins at 1060. 
Genqler was distinguished from Jenkins in that the Genqler 
jury was not deadlocked. In its note to the trial court the jury 
gave no indication that it was deadlocked. The Genqler Court held 
that "when the jury is not deadlocked, it is not coercive to inform 
the jury that it must return verdicts on all counts," at 1376. 
Indeed, standard jury instructions require the jury to reach 
a guilty or not guilty verdict. In this case, the last jury 
instruction given to the jury prior to deliberations read, "your 
verdict in this case must be: Guilty; or Not Guilty; as your 
deliberations may result." [See jury instructions]. Additionally, 
after reading the written jury instructions, and prior to recessing 
the jury for deliberations, the judge in this case went on to 
further instruct the jury and explain the verdict form, stating 
"... as soon as all of you have agreed on a verdict, whether it's 
17 
guilty, or whether it's not guilty on that count . . . ." 
[Transcript at 115]. 
All of these statements were proper because they were made to 
a jury which was not deadlocked, just as the statements which are 
at issue here were made to a jury which was not deadlocked, and 
therefore, cannot be said to be coercive. 
Whether the jury is deadlocked is often an important 
distinction in determining whether Allen charges are coercive. 
See, e.g., U.S. v. Felix, 996 F.2d 203, 208 (8th Cir. 1993); 
Underwood v. Kelly, 692 F.Supp. 147, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Andrews 
v. State, 794 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). 
In the present case, there was no indication that the jury was 
deadlocked. There were no notes from the jury to the judge, and in 
fact, the jury indicated on the record that they were very close to 
returning a verdict when they were called back in, stating that 
they needed only a few more minutes of deliberation. 
The instructions probably had little, if any impact on the 
juror's verdict because they were only five minutes away from a 
verdict. The instructions cannot be per se coercive. 
4, THE INSTRUCTIONS ARE NOT COERCIVE UNDER THE SPECIFIC FACTS. 
Appellant, in relying on State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah 
18 
App. 1988), posits four reasons why the jury instruction is 
coercive. We will address each of those herein. 
A. There was no "significant colloquy" between the judge and 
the jury. 
First, Appellant claims that there was a "significant 
colloquy" between the judge and jury foreperson, which coerced the 
jury into returning a verdict. [Appellant's Brief, p. 14.] While 
the Lactod Court stated that a significant colloquy is a factor 
they will look at in determining coercion, it is but one factor a 
court will look at under a specific set of circumstances. Other 
factors an appellate court will consider include: a change in a 
jury's deliberations after indicating it is deadlocked; a judge 
threatening to keep a jury for an unreasonable length of time; or 
whether the instruction was in the ABA' s recommended standards for 
verdict urging instructions, at 31. 
While the Lactod court stated that a significant colloquy is 
a factor it will consider in determining coercion, 761 P.2d at 31, 
the court did not specify why or what would make a significant 
colloquy coercive. 
In Lactod/ the court made a statement to the jury of nineteen 
sentences, occupying a half-page in the Pacific Reporter, and the 
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jury made no oral response to the instruction. Lactod, 761 P.2d at 
28. In the present case, the judge made a statement, consisting of 
seventeen short sentences to the jury. The entire exchange that 
Appellant labels as a "significant colloquy" takes up only one 
transcript page. The only distinction between Lactod and the 
present case is that the jury responded with one sentence. 
Appellant seems to argue that as soon as the jury makes some sort 
of response to the instruction, no matter how brief, it suddenly 
becomes a "significant colloquy" in violation of Lactod. In 
ordinary language, "significant" implies more than brief. 
Likely what the Lactod court meant in its term "significant 
colloquy" is the type of coercive statement made by the trial judge 
in People v. Branch, 462 N.E.2d 868 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1984), where 
the trial court singled out a juror who had expressed unwillingness 
to vote guilty because he did not want anyone to go to jail, and 
declared that the juror should not have received jury service. 
There was nothing of that type of exchange here, and nothing 
that would seem to indicate coercion specifically because of an 
exchange. 
B. Coercion cannot legally or rationally be inferred from 
the time of deliberation. 
Second, Appellant argues that because the jury deliberated for 
20 
only five minutes after the instruction, this Court should infer 
coercion, [Appellant's Brief, p. 15.] While that may be true with 
a jury that has indicated it is hopelessly deadlocked, it is not so 
here, or in other similar factual situations. 
For example, in Underwood v. Kelly, 692 F. Supp. 146 (E.D.N.Y. 
1988), the Court faced a strikingly similar situation to the 
present case. During deliberations, the jury was in the courtroom 
after requesting a read-back of the transcript. The jury had not 
indicated they were deadlocked. 
While the jury was in the courtroom, the judge expressed his 
desire for the jury to retire for the night and return the next 
morning. The jury foreman requested ten more minutes to 
deliberate. Five minutes later, the jury returned with a verdict. 
The defendant asserted, exactly like this case, that the 
instruction to cease for the night coerced the jury into returning 
a verdict, which could be inferred by a verdict after only five 
minutes. The court found no coercion in that case, stating "The 
jury in Petitioner's case asked for another ten minutes to 
deliberate. In a situation where agreement is near, ten minutes of 
deliberation does not indicate coercion. In contrast, where a jury 
is deadlocked after hours, perhaps days of deliberations, a sudden 
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decision ten minutes later indicates prejudice" Id., at 152. 
(aff'd, 875 F.857) (cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 117, 493 U.S. 837). 
See also, U.S. v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1137 (8th Cir. 1990) (no 
coercive effect when jury returns verdict after only ten minutes of 
Allen charge); U.S. v. Wauneka, 842 F.2d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(fact that jury returned verdict shortly after Allen charge not 
sufficient to establish coercion); State v. Lonqobardi, 756 P.2d 
1098, (Kan. 1988) (length of deliberation time is no indication of 
error); U.S. v. Chiqbo, 38 F.3d 543, 546 (11th Cir. 1994) (cert 
denied, 116 S.Ct. 92) . 
When the jury is not deadlocked, like this case, any inference 
of coercion is even weaker. Because the judge recalled the jury 
sua sponte, there is no way of knowing how close to a verdict the 
jury was when they were called in. Likewise, in Andrews v. State, 
794 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), the Court held, "we cannot 
infer that the communication compelled the verdict rather than the 
verdict having resulted from the jurors' completing their 
deliberations." Id., at 48. One may just as easily infer that the 
jury would have reached a guilty verdict in only five minutes even 
without the additional instruction. One court declared: 
What prompted the jury to announce its verdict so quickly 
after receiving the court's [instruction] ...we do not 
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know. We have no way of knowing what discussions took 
place in the jury room during the time [immediately 
before that instruction.] It would be pure speculation to 
conclude that the court's response triggered the verdict. 
U.S. v. Felix, 996 F.2d 203, 208 (8th Cir. 1993). 
C. Informing the jury that they may have to return next week 
to continue deliberations was not coercive. 
Third, Appellant claims that the trial court judge threatened 
to keep the jury together for "an unreasonable length of time," 
[Appellant's Brief, p. 15]. Appellant claims that because the 
trial court threatened to make the jury return next week if they 
could not come to a decision that evening, the jury was coerced 
into returning a verdict to avoid returning. There can be no 
coercion in requiring a jury to fulfill its duty by deliberating 
until they reach a verdict, or until within his discretion, the 
judge declares a deadlocked jury. Many courts have considered this 
claim and have not supported Appellant's argument unless there is 
an abuse of discretion by the trial court. See, e.g., Thomas v. 
Jones, 891 F.2d 1500, 1502 (11th Cir. 1989) (no coercion in 
requiring jury to return next day to continue deliberations); Clark 
v. Duqqer, 834 F.2d 1561, 1565 (11th Cir. 1987) (no coercion in 
requiring jury to continue deliberations late into the evening when 
no complaints of fatigue) (cert, denied, 108 S.Ct. 1282, 485 U.S. 
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982); Underwood/ 692 F. Supp. at 151 (no coercion in informing jury 
they will be sequestered for the night if no verdict); People v. 
Hanks, 569 N.E.2d 205 208 (111 Ct. App. 1991) (no coercion in 
informing jury they may be sequestered); State v. Bofield* 421 
N.W.2d 794, 797 (Neb. 1988); People v. Bovd/ 542 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989. 
In fact, the Texas Court of Appeals held that telling the jury 
that they would soon have to stop deliberations and return the next 
day is not an instruction at all, but a discussion about 
scheduling, and thus not subject to Allen charge scrutiny. Andrews 
v. State/ 794 S.W.2d at 48; see also U.S. v. McMurraV/ 818 F.2d 24, 
26 (10th Cir. 1987) (no coercion in informing jury he would soon 
have to dismiss jurors for the day, when the jury returned verdict 
soon thereafter) (cert, denied, 108 S.Ct. 120, 484 U.S. 837). 
Because there is no coercion in informing the jury they may be 
required to continue deliberations, the only question is whether 
the trial court could have required the jury to return next week. 
The length of time a jury is kept together is a matter of 
trial court discretion, and will not be disturbed, absent abuse of 
discretion. People v. Marshall/ 521 N.E.2d 538, 547 (111. Ct. App. 
1987); State v. Johnson/ 668 A.2d 97, 108 (Penn. 1995) (cert. 
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denied, 117 S.Ct. 1257); Parrish v. State, 515 N.E.2d 516, 520 
(Ind. 1987); State v. Lerov, 724 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1987); Commonwealth v. Chester, 587 A.2d 1367, 1380 (Penn. 1991) 
(cert, denied, 112 S.Ct. 422); State v. Akins, 399 S.E.2d 760, 763 
(S.C. 1990) (cert, denied, 111 S.Ct. 2913). In determining whether 
the trial court abused its discretion, this Court should look at 
the charges at issue, complexity of issues, amount of testimony to 
consider, length of trial, solemnity of proceedings, and 
indications from the jury on possibility of verdict. Johnson, 668 
A.2d at 108. In the present case, the trial was only one day long, 
and there were not many issues to decide, but the trial court 
stated that it wanted to dismiss the jury after two hours of 
deliberations and have them return next week. Thus, the question 
is whether it would have been an abuse of discretion to make the 
jury deliberate more than two hours in this case. Clearly 
Appellant cannot show an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
judge in extending deliberations for more than two hours. 
D. The trial court judge did not comment on the strength of 
the evidence, nor did he coerce individual jurors to give 
up their honest and true feelings. 
Finally, Appellant claims that the judge erroneously commented 
on the "strength of the evidence," (Appellant's Brief, p. 16) in 
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saying that "there was only one real issue here on the one count," 
[Transcript at 138.] Such a comment does not, as Appellant claims, 
relate to the strength of the evidence. The judge did not mention 
any evidence in his comments. The comments related to the number 
of issues the jury had to decide. It was not error to state there 
was one issue on the one count, because that statement was entirely 
true. Counsel had already stipulated to the fact that the 
Defendant was over .08 by agreeing that the intoxilyzer result was 
.157 [Transcript at 48]. The only element which was at issue with 
respect to the Driving Under the Influence Charge, was the issue of 
physical control. The Judge was not commenting on the evidence 
presented when he referred to the fact that counsel had stipulated 
to all but this element with respect to this count, and which was 
also the only element on that count which both counsel argued in 
their closing statements [Transcript at 128]. The judge only 
illustrated the relative simplicity of the issues before them by 
noting that of the two counts one required only one issue to be 
determined—the issue of physical control. The judge did not, as 
Appellant claims, "usurp the role of the fact-finder" but only 
stated the obvious [Appellant's Brief, p.16]. The jurors still 
needed to determine whether the elements of the open container 
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charge were met. 
5. No Requirement to Give Full Allen Charge. 
Finally, Appellant claims that the judge committed reversible 
error because he did not comment, like the judge in Lactod/ to 
charge each juror to be compromising, but not to give up on each 
individual's true feelings, (761 P.2d at 32 n.2 quoting Allen, 17 
S.Ct. At 157) . 
Such a charge is not required to escape a finding of coercion. 
See, People v. Ashenden, 460 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) 
(not error to abstain from specifically remind jurors that they 
should not surrender their conscientiously-held beliefs). What is 
important in an Allen charge is that the instruction is not 
directed towards the minority or single holdout juror, is not 
directed at any individual person and does not urge a particular 
verdict, none of which the trial court judge did in this case. 
See, U.S. v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1138 (8th Cir. 1990); People v. 
Sheldon, 771 P.2d 1330, (Cal. 1989); Smith v. U.S., 542 A.2d 823, 
825 (D.C. App. 1988); U.S. v. Lash, 937 F.2d 1077, (6th Cir. 1991) 
(cert, denied, 112 S.Ct. 397, 502 U.S. 949). 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
In this case, the trial court's initial statements, which are 
more properly described as administrative, were to a jury which had 
been deliberating two hours, and which had not indicated in any way 
that they were deadlocked or unable to reach a decision. In fact, 
the majority of the court's statements, and those which Appellant 
objects to, were made after the jury indicated that they could 
reach a decision very soon. 
A supplemental administrative statement or verdict-urging 
instruction to a deliberating jury that is not deadlocked is not 
prohibited provided the instruction is not coercive per se or 
coercive under the specific circumstances of the case. 
Appellant has not proven that the statements were coercive, 
either per se or under the specific circumstances. The judge did 
not give a statement which was inherently coercive, nor did he make 
statements which would clearly force jurors to reach a decision or 
give up conscientiously held beliefs. 
There was no coercive colloquy between judge and jury. 
Coercion cannot be inferred from the length of deliberation time. 
It was not an abuse of discretion, nor was it coercive to tell the 
jury they may have to return next week to continue deliberations. 
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Finally, contrary to Appellant's assertion, the judge did not 
comment on the evidence, or coerce any juror to give up their 
honest and true feelings. For the foregoing reasons, the 
conviction of Appellant should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this day of 
WlttA, 4v, 1998. 
Laura H. Cabanilla 
Deputy County Attorney 
For C. Kay Bryson 
Utah County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief to: 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603 
29 
MAR ~H 1998 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Finally, contrary to Appellants assertion, the judge did not 
comment on the evidence, or coerce any juror to give up their 
honest and true feelings. For the foregoing reasons, the 
conviction of Appellant should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this v^A^ l day of 1998. 
1 
Laur^/H. Cabanilla 
Deputy County Attorney 
For C. Kay Bryson 
Utah County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief to: 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box WL" 





of the witnesses who have testified, it's the State's 
position that you will return a verdict to convict the 
defendant of both charges. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Court would like to thank 
both counsel for their pr-esentation of the case to the 
jury. If I can have Ms. Stevensen stand, please, I will 
administer the oath to her to take charge of the jury. 
Ms. Stevensen, do you solemnly swear that you 
will take charge of this jury and take them to some 
private and convenient place where they may deliberate 
upon their verdict, allowing no one to speak to them, nor 
to do so yourself, unless so ordered by the Court, and to 
return them into court when they have so reached such a 
verdict or when so ordered, so help you God? 
COURT CLERK: I do. 
THE COURT: Thank you. The Court will be in 
recess, then, as the jury deliberates. So members of the 
jury, if you'll go with Ms. Stevensen, she'll take you to 
the jury room. 
(Recess taken while jury deliberates) 
THE COURT: We'll go on the record now in the 
matter of State versus Steven Clements. Both counsel 
are present, as is Mr. Clements. We have invited the six 
members of the jury to come into the court. Members of 
the jury, have you been able to arrive at a verdict? And 
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who is your foreperson? 
MR. HALL: Well, they said I would be. 
THE COURT: Okay, then. Mr. Hall, you are the 
foreperson, and has the jury been able to arrive at a 
verdict on each count, sir? 
THE COURT: Well, it's now 7:30 and the jury has 
been deliberating approximately two hours. It would be my 
proposal that we recess at this time. We have this 
calendar every Wednesday at 1 o'clock. If you can't reach 
a verdict this evening, that we reconvene at 1 o'clock 
next Wednesday, and that I handle other cases and other 
calendar while you're in the jury room. Then you can take 
as long as you need to to arrive at a verdict. 
Do you think that will be worthwhile? Or if you 
think that you're unable to arrive at a verdict at this 
time, you can tell me that also. If you just don't think 
you can unanimously agree on a verdict on each count. 
MR. HALL: Some of us think we should go back in 
for two minutes. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's do that, then. We 
will have you brought back out in five minutes, then. 
If you can't, then we will have to figure out something 
else to do. I would sincerely hope that you .can reach a 
verdict this evening. This is not a complicated case. 
There's only one real issue here on the one count, and 
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it's either "yes" or "no.." You have to make up your 
minds, folks. So we'll have you brought out again in 
five minutes, then, 
(Recess taken while jury further deliberates) 
THE COURT: We're on the record now in the matter 
of State versus Steven D. Clements, and he is present with 
Counsel. The prosecutor is present, and the jury members 
are present, seated in the jury box. Mr. Hall is acting 
as jury foreperson. 
Mr. Hall, has the jury been able to arrive at a 
verdict on each count? 
MR. HALL: Yes, we have. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Stevensen, would you 
go to the jury box, please, and retrieve the verdict forms 
from Mr. Hall. Then I will read those into the'record. 
Thank you. 
Before I read the verdict into the record, 
let me thank the jury. I think you've been extremely 
conscientious and you've spent a great deal of time, 
obviously, analyzing the evidence. In behalf of the 
parties of this case we thank you for your time today. 
Again, we apologize to you for the late starting time. 
I will read the verdicts, then, in the order 
that I've been given them. "We, the jury, find the 
defendant Steven D. Clements guilty of the offense of 
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1 open container." The second reads, "We, the jury, find 
2 the defendant Steven D. Clements guilty of driving under 
3 the influence of alcohol." 
4 The Court will discharge the jury at this time. 
5 You are free to go, folks, and thank you so much. So 
6 we'll excuse you at this time with our thanks for service 
7 well done. The easiest way I think would be just to go 
8 right out through this door out the front, wouldn't it, 
9 Carla? You will not be called during the rest of this 
10 jury term, since you now have served on a jury that has 
11 rendered a verdict. So thank you so much. 
12 (Jury exits the courtroom) 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Clements, the law provides that 
14 you return for sentencing after 2 days and within 45 days, 
15 or you may waive that time and be sentenced now. Do you 
16 prefer to come back for sentencing — if you'd like to 
17 confer with your attorney and make that decision — or 
18 would you rather be sentenced today? 
19 (Counsel conferring with defendant off the record) 
20 MR. GALE: We would waive the sentencing time 
21 period, Judge, and just ask for the Court to grant 
22 sentence today. 
23 THE COURT: All right. Well, it's obvious that 
24 Mr. Clements has at least two prior DUI's within the six 
25 years. So are you aware of anything else I should know 
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